Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights provides:
We, the People of the State of Maryland, grateful to Almighty God for our civil and religious liberty, and taking into our serious consideration the best means of establishing a good Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and more permanent security thereof, declare:
Art. 5. (a)
(1) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England


Stuart v. Board of Elections, 266 Md. 440 (1972) states:
We have heretofore unequivocally recognized the common law right of any person, absent a statute to the contrary, to "adopt any name by which he may become known, and by which he may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued."

Under the common law of Maryland, as derived from the common law of England, Mary Emily Stuart's surname 449*449 thus has not been changed by operation of law to that of Austell solely by reason of her marriage to him. On the contrary, because of her exclusive, consistent, nonfraudulent use of her maiden name, she is entitled to use the name Mary Emily Stuart unless there is a statute to the contrary.

Hall v. Hall, 351 A. 2d 917 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 1976 states:
The common law recognized that an individual could change the given name, surname, or both, by which the community knew him merely by assuming a new one, with the restriction that the change could not be effected for fraudulent purposes or to interfere with the rights of others. 44 Cornell L. Rev. 144, 145 (1958) and cases therein cited.[6] The common law sprang and was gradually developed out of the groundwork of custom. It was the ancient custom for the son to adopt a surname at will, regardless of that borne by his father, and the practice extended to the given name also. Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947 (1910).[7]
Maryland recognizes the common law rule.

Klein v. Klein, 373 A. 2d 86 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 1977 states:
At common law, a person could take any name he pleased, so long as it was not done for fraudulent purposes or to interfere with the rights of others. Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1508 (1974); 44 Cornell L.Q. 144 (1958). That Maryland follows the common law with respect to a name change is no longer open to question. Hardy v. Hardy, 269 Md. 412, 306 A.2d 244 (1973); Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972); Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940); Hall v. Hall, supra.

This State's name change statutes, Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §§ 32 and 123, are not to be interpreted as the exclusive manner in which a name may be changed, Hall v. Hall, supra, but are in furtherance of and confer an official sanction upon a common law prerogative. We think that an adult or emancipated person may adopt as his or her legal name any name he or she pleases[9] provided that at the time of the adoption of the name it is not illegal, fraudulent, obscene or otherwise offensive, and does not interfere with the rights of others. See Egner v. Egner, supra.

Torbit v. State, 102 Md. App. 530 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 1994 states:
Maryland recognizes common law name changes. Stuart v. Board of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 446, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). As the Court of Appeals stated in Hardy v. Hardy, "a person may adopt any name by which he wishes to become known, as long as he does so consistently and nonfraudulently." 269 Md. 412, 415, 306 A.2d 244 (1973) (citations omitted). This fact, however, does not preclude appellant from changing his name pursuant to Maryland Rules BH70-75 and Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 16, § 123. Neither the statutory nor the common law method is to be interpreted as the exclusive manner in which a name may be changed. Klein v. Klein, 36 Md. App. 177, 181, 373 A.2d 86 (1977); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 222, 351 A.2d 917 (1976). "In Maryland, a person may change his name under the common law rule or through a judicial proceeding as he desires." Hall, 30 Md. App. at 222, 351 A.2d 917.

Schroeder v. Broadfoot, 790 A. 2d 773 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 2002 states:
Maryland follows the common law of names, that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a person may take and use any name he wants, so long as his purpose is not fraudulent and the use of the name does not interfere with the rights of others. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 446, 295 A.2d 223 (1972) (holding that because, at common law, a person may "adopt any name by which he may become known, and by which he may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued," a woman may retain her birth name after marriage merely by consistently and nonfraudulently using it) (citation omitted). See also Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 597, 16 A.2d 642 (1940) (holding that a person may be prosecuted under any name he has adopted or assumed). In Hall v. Hall, 30 Md.App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976), then-Chief Judge Orth, writing for this Court, explained:

The common law recognized that an individual could change the given name, surname, or both, by which the community knew him merely by assuming a new one, with the restriction that the change could not be effected for fraudulent purposes or to interfere with the rights of others. The common law sprang and was gradually developed out of the groundwork of custom. It was the ancient custom for the son to adopt a surname at will, regardless of that borne by his father, and the practice extended to the given name also.

Id. at 219, 351 A.2d 917 (footnotes omitted) (citing Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 428, 90 N.E. 947, 950 (1910) ("The elementary writers are uniform in laying down the rule that at common law a man may change his name at will.")). The statutes and rules governing change of name "are not to be interpreted as the exclusive manner in which a name may be changed, ... but are in furtherance of and confer an official sanction upon a common law prerogative." Klein v. Klein, 36 Md.App. 177, 181, 373 A.2d 86 (1977).

Doe v. Dewees (D.M.D. 2020) states:
Where Doe argues that “Jane Doe” is not a pseudonym but instead is the name she uses in everyday life, Defendants’ arguments that Doe may not use a pseudonym are not relevant. Although Doe has not shown that Jane Doe was her name at birth or that she legally changed her name to Jane Doe, “Maryland recognizes common law name changes,” and “[n]either the statutory or common law method is . . . the exclusive manner in which a name may be changed.” Torbitt v. State, 650 A.2d 311, 314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (citing Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 295 A.2d 223 (Md. 1972)). “[A]bsent a statute to the contrary,” there is a common law right of any person “to adopt any name by which [a person] may become known, and by which [that person] may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued.” Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 295 A.2d 223, 226 (Md. 1972). “[T]his [is] without regard to [one’s] true name.” Romans v. State, 16 A.2d 642, 646 (Md. 1940). Such adoption and use of another name has been approved where it is “consistent” and “nonfraudulent.” See, e.g., Stuart, 295 A.2d at 226 (noting that a woman may use a surname other than her husband’s where it is used consistently and nonfraudulently, and that “a man may lawfully change his name without resorting to legal proceedings and by general usage or habit acquire another”); Romans, 16 A.2d at 646 (stating that a person may be prosecuted under an adopted or assumed name). With respect to prosecution of a crime, “the name is only material for its evidentiary value to make certain the particular person charged with the offense.” Romans, 16 A.2d at 646.

Here, Doe alleges in the Amended Complaint that “Jane Doe” is in fact her name, and she reiterates in her Opposition that it is not a pseudonym. Am. Compl. at 10. Doe previously submitted affidavits from other individuals attesting that Doe actually went by the name “Jane Doe” prior to the events in question. At this early stage of the litigation, the record before the Court does not allow for a finding that Doe’s use of the name “Jane Doe” is not consistent or for fraudulent purposes. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion as to this argument. However, in discovery, Defendants may engage in factual development on the issue of Doe’s legal name and identity, and Doe will be expected to demonstrate that the use of her preferred name, “Jane Doe,” has been consistent and not for fraudulent purposes or a reason contrary to Maryland common law.

Affidavit